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1. Introduction
Many idealists have worried about the epistemological assumptions of realism.1 The 
worry is that, if it is possible for truths about ordinary objects to outstrip our experi-
ences in the ways that realists typically suppose, we could never be justified in our 
beliefs about objects. In response to this argument, philosophers have offered a variety 
of proposals to defend the epistemology of our object judgments under the assump-
tion of realism. But in this essay, I will offer a new type of epistemic argument against 
realism to which the standard responses in the literature do not apply.
The new epistemic argument can be seen as an inversion of the traditional epistemic 
argument. The traditional argument (see section 2) considers our actual experiential 
evidence and argues that it does not, under the assumption of realism, justify judg-
ments about objects. But in the new argument (see section 3), I consider possible 
situations where we receive evidence that—by the realist’s lights—reveals our object 
judgments to be false. I argue that, even in these possible cases where—according to 
the realist—we learn that our object judgments are mistaken, we would continue to 
talk about objects just as we always had. I then argue that the best explanation of this 
behavior is that, in fact, truths about objects do not outstrip our experiences in the way 
that realists suppose.
In addition to raising a challenge for realism, the epistemology of our object dis-
course has implications for the idealist’s own positive metaphysical view. In section 4, 
I discuss how the idealist must understand the dependence between objects and our 
experiences of them if she is to secure epistemic advantages over the realist.
1 See, e.g., Berkeley (1948: 227–30) and Foster (2008: chs. 1–4).
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2. Background
I will begin by providing background on the dispute between the realist and the idealist 
over ordinary objects.2 I will present the new epistemic argument against realism in 
section 3.
2.1 The Dispute over Idealism
For the purposes of this essay, I will characterize the dispute over idealism as a dis-
agreement over the following thesis:
Ordinary Object Idealism (OI): Truths about ordinary objects and their manifest3 
properties supervene on truths about actual and counterfactual human experiences.
Of course, there are other ways of characterizing idealism that may be more useful in 
other theoretical contexts. In particular, it may sometimes be more useful to characterize 
idealism in terms of a stronger relation of metaphysical dependence between objects 
and experiences (see Greco (this volume)) instead of OI’s characterization in terms of 
supervenience.4
But as I explain below, OI is still strong enough to distinguish realists from idealists.5 
And given my aims in this essay, it will be most useful to focus on this weaker thesis. 
While there are many different versions of idealism, proponents have often shared a 
worry that realism threatens the epistemology of our object judgments. My goal in this 
essay is to provide a new epistemic argument against realism that is available to many 
different types of idealists. To this end, OI provides a way of framing the debate that is 
neutral on many underlying metaphysical issues. For example, each of the following 
versions of idealism entails OI:
•	 An	 identity view on which ordinary objects are identified with collections or 
bundles of sensations (as on one popular interpretation of Berkeley 1948)
•	 A	constitution view on which ordinary objects are constituted by our phenomenal 
experiences (see Foster 2008)
•	 A	phenomenalist view on which ordinary objects are logically constructed from 
experiences (see Russell 1985)
2 N.b.: throughout this essay, I will restrict attention to the dispute between realists and idealists as it 
concerns ordinary objects—items like tables, trees, and human bodies. This dispute may also arise for other 
types of items, such as the causal relation (see Bernstein (this volume)) or numbers (see Warmke 
(manuscript)).
3 The scope of OI is restricted to truths about objects’ manifest properties: the types of basic properties 
we seem to be directly acquainted with in experience. Examples of such truths include: ‘x is blue’, ‘x is cube-
shaped’, ‘x and y are twice as far apart as x and z’, etc. In contrast, the scope of OI excludes theoretical truths 
(e.g., ‘x is negatively charged’) and “higher-level” truths (e.g., ‘x is a zebra’).
4 A set of truths A supervenes upon another set B iff there can be no difference in the A-truths without 
some difference in the B-truths.
5 To be more precise: OI will distinguish realists from idealists so long as there is a certain restriction on 
the types of experiences considered relevant to the thesis. I will discuss this issue in 2.2.
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In contrast, because she believes that truths about objects depend (at least in part) 
on truths about some external reality independent of human minds, the realist will 
deny OI. To see this, consider a Cartesian evil demon scenario: a scenario where our 
experiences are caused not by a world of material objects, but instead by an evil demon 
intent on deceiving us. According to the (typical) realist, this is a case where all actual 
and counterfactual experiences are just as we normally think, but truths about objects 
are radically different from what we take them to be.6
It is worth noting that OI may not always conform to our intuitive judgments about 
which views do and do not count as idealist. In addition, I will consider later (see 3.6) 
whether certain “non-standard” realist views may actually accept OI. But these poten-
tial discrepancies are no genuine concern. As I mentioned earlier, there are many ways 
we might characterize idealism; OI just happens to be the most useful thesis to consider 
when presenting the new epistemic argument. Suffice to say that this argument will 
only support versions of idealism that entail OI.
2.2 Counterfactual Experiences
Any viable form of idealism must allow for the existence of objects that are not actually 
experienced by human subjects. Since one prominent strategy for accounting for such 
objects is to appeal to counterfactual experiences,7 I have appealed to counterfactual 
experiences when formulating OI.
“Counterfactual experiences” should be understood broadly to include all ordinary 
experiences subjects consider relevant to assessing the truth of judgments about objects. 
For example, in the case of S* ≡ “There is a cup on the table”, the counterfactual 
experiences might include: the experiences we would have if we were to look towards 
the table, the experiences we would have if we were to attempt to lift up the apparent 
cup, the experience we would have if we were to look into a mirror reflecting the 
table, the experience we would have if we were to use a drone to photograph the 
table, and so on.8
The appeal to counterfactual experiences raises several questions:
•	 If	the	idealist	rejects	the	existence	of	mind-independent	material	objects,	then	
what supports the counterfactual experiences mentioned in OI?
6 Of course, certain types of realists deny the coherence of this demon scenario. Will these realists also 
reject OI? The answer is “yes”, but for simplicity, I will postpone discussing such realists until 3.6. For now, 
I will continue to appeal to the demon scenario to intuitively illustrate the disagreement over OI.
7 See, e.g., Berkeley (1948: 250–6), Dummett (2004: ch. 4), and Mill (2009: ch. 11).
8 On the other hand, it’s worth emphasizing the restriction to “ordinary” experiences: the types of expe-
riences of objects we are accustomed to having in everyday life. To see the need for this restriction, suppose 
it turns out that a demon is causing our experiences. The restriction to ordinary experiences would rule out, 
e.g.: the experience I would have if the demon revealed its presence to me. If OI allowed for this kind of 
non-standard experience, then realists might also accept OI.
This restriction will also rule out certain trivializing mechanisms, such as: the experience I would have 
if there was a God who told me the truth about P. Again: if we allowed for such experiences, then realists 
might accept OI as well.
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•	 How	will	the	idealist	account	for	truths	about	objects	in	environments	where	




These are important questions, but it is outside the scope of this essay to address 
them. For now, I will simply assume as a working hypothesis that the idealist has satis-
factory responses to these objections.10
2.3 The Traditional Epistemic Argument
Many idealists have worried about the epistemological assumptions of realism.11 
Suppose that truths about objects outstrip truths about our experiences in the way that 
realists suppose. Then there could be a world just like ours with respect to all actual and 
counterfactual experiences but with different truths about objects (for example: a 
demon scenario). According to traditional idealists, such a possibility would show that 
our experiences do not justify our judgments about objects. But it is obvious that our 
experiences do	justify	many	such	judgments.	So	realism	is	false.	Here	is	the	traditional	
argument as it specifically applies to the thesis OI:
Traditional Epistemic Argument
Let S be a sentence about objects and their manifest properties that we judge to be 
true on the basis of our experiences.
Premise 1: If truths about objects do not supervene on truths about actual and 
counterfactual experiences, then our experiences cannot epistemically justify our 
judgment that S.
Premise 2: Our experiences can epistemically justify our judgment that S.
—————
Therefore: truths about objects supervene on truths about actual and counterfac-
tual experiences.
Despite its historical prominence, few contemporary philosophers accept the above 
argument. Most realists will reject premise 1 by claiming that, even if it is coherent to 
suppose that there could be a world with the same actual and counterfactual experi-
ences but with different truths about objects, such possibilities do not threaten the 
justification of our object judgments.
There are different ways one might resist this premise. For example, Vogel (1990) 
claims that we can justify the existence of material objects using inference to the best 
9 See Sellars (1963) for a version of this objection applying to early twentieth-century versions of 
phenomenalism.
10 In particular, I will ignore potential counterexamples to OI involving environments where human 
experiences are not nomically possible.
11 See, e.g., Berkeley (1948: 227–30) and Foster (2008: chs. 1–4).
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explanation. Another strategy (see DeRose (1999)) is to give a contextualist defense of 
our knowledge of material objects, claiming that skeptical hypotheses do not threaten 
our judgments about objects in ordinary contexts. A third response (see Pryor (2000)) 
is dogmatism: the view that our object judgments enjoy a default justification that is not 
threatened by skeptical hypotheses.
I think that each of the above proposals provides the realist with a plausible response 
to the traditional argument. But in this essay, I will raise a new epistemic argument 
against realism which is not threatened by the standard responses in the literature.
2.4 A New Epistemic Argument
The realist views our object judgments as “hostage to fortune” in the following sense: it 
is coherent to suppose that all actual and counterfactual experiences are just as they 
are, but due to facts about some external reality independent of human minds, object 
truths are different. An evil demon scenario might be an example of such a case.
But there is a problem: when we consider our actual linguistic behavior, it does not 
seem that object judgments are hostage to fortune in the way that realists suppose. This 
can be seen with a simple thought experiment.12 Suppose we travel to the all-knowing, 
perfectly trustworthy Oracle to settle once and for all whether there is an external 
world of material objects. There, we receive a disheartening report: our experiences are 
caused not by material objects, but rather by a malicious demon intent on deceiving us.
This testimony would surprise and dismay us. We might say things like “Apples and 
books don’t really exist!” and “We don’t have bodies after all!” But this immediate shock 
would pass. And after several minutes, we would go back to saying things like “There is 
an apple in the kitchen” or “I’m walking to the bus stop” just as we always had. This is 
because we would have to return to the ordinary concerns of human life: buying 
groceries, taking the bus to work, and so on.
This thought experiment raises a puzzle. Ordinarily, when we receive evidence E 
that contravenes our judgment that P, we abandon our judgment that P. But in the 
above thought experiment, we continue to make judgments about objects even after 
receiving evidence that—by the realist’s lights13—falsifies those judgments.
There are various ways we might try to explain this puzzling behavior. But in the 
next section, I argue that the best explanation of the thought experiment is that realism 
is false: truths about objects are not hostage to fortune in the way that realists suppose. 
Here	is	the	argument	step	by	step:
New Epistemic Argument
Premise 1: Even if we were to receive evidence E about some (alleged) external 
reality that—by the realist’s lights—falsifies our object judgments, we would con-
tinue to make judgments about objects on the basis of our experiences.
12 See Smithson (manuscript a: 4.1) for a different version of this thought experiment.
13 As I mentioned in fn. 5, there are some realists who reject the coherence of the demon scenario. For 
ease of presentation, I will postpone discussing these realists until 3.6.
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Premise 2: If we would continue to make judgments about objects even after 
receiving E, then truths about objects supervene on truths about actual and coun-
terfactual experiences.
—————
Therefore: truths about objects supervene on truths about actual and counterfac-
tual experiences.
The new epistemic argument can be seen as an inversion of the traditional argument 
presented in 2.3. The traditional argument considers our actual experiential evidence 
and argues that it does not, under the assumption of realism, justify judgments about 
objects. But in the new argument, I consider possible situations where we receive 
evidence that—by the realist’s lights—reveals our object judgments to be false. I argue 
that, even in these possible cases where—according to the realist—we learn that our 
object judgments are mistaken, we would continue to talk about objects just as we 
always had. I then argue that the best explanation of this behavior is that, in fact, truths 
about objects do not outstrip our experiences in the way that realists suppose.
I have already made the case for premise 1 with the Oracle thought experiment. 
I will defend premise 2 in section 3.
3. Defending Premise 2
As I mentioned above, I think the proper response to the Oracle thought experiment is 
to abandon the epistemological assumptions of realism. But to establish premise 2, we 
must rule out ways of responding to the thought experiment that are compatible with 
realism. I will consider two such proposals in this section.
3.1 Fictionalism
In the thought experiment, we continue making judgments about objects even after 
learning that our experiences are not caused by material objects. 14 One explanation of 
this behavior is fictionalism. As I will use the term, fictionalism encompasses views on 
which our object judgments do not aim at the literal truth, but instead involve fiction, 
pretense, or non-literal speech.15 As a response to the Oracle thought experiment, 
fictionalism is compatible with realism: even though our object judgments are literally 
false in the demon scenario, we continue making object judgments because we are 
pretending or using non-literal speech.
While fictionalism provides an attractive response to the Oracle puzzle, it faces a 
number of independent objections. One issue is that the standard types of evidence 
indicative of fictional or non-literal speech are absent from our object discourse. For 
example,	if	a	speaker	says	“I	have	butterflies	in	my	stomach”,	and	a	child	asks	“How	do	
14 The discussion of 3.1 parallels the discussion of Smithson (manuscript a: 4.2).
15 I address an alternative form of fictionalism—revolutionary fictionalism—in fn. 17.
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you know they aren’t moths?”, the original speaker will explain that she was not speaking 
literally.16 The same goes for all other clear cases of non-literal or fictional discourse. 
But in any ordinary context, speakers have no inclination to retract their object 
judgments in response to questions like “Is there really a chair?”
In addition, the present proposal conflicts with our self-understanding of the dis-
tinction between fictional and non-fictional discourse. As the terms ‘fictional’ and 
‘non-fictional’ are used by ordinary speakers, they mark a clear distinction between 
judgments like “Romeo loved Juliet” and judgments like “There is a bicycle” (when, 
e.g., one is pointing to a bicycle). So any theory on which all of our object discourse is 
fictional fails to respect this distinction as it is actually used.17	Says	Hirsch	(2005:	90):
distinctions themselves must be based on a charitable interpretation of what people say. . . . 
If you simply set yourself the task of interpreting in the most charitable way possible the language 
of our community, you cannot avoid the conclusion that the ontological sentences typically 
accepted by the community are true in that language, in the strictest and most literal sense.
While fictionalism deserves further discussion,18 the above shortcomings should 
motivate us to look for a better response.
3.2 Conceptual Change
Suppose that, in our sleep, we are magically transported to Twin-Earth.19 Upon 
waking, and still unaware of our journey, we might turn on a faucet and say “This water 
is cold”. Suppose that the Oracle then tells us about our journey, and tells us that the 
watery	substance	from	the	faucet	is	XYZ,	not	H2O. We would react by saying things 
like: “So this liquid isn’t really water after all!”20
But if we were to remain on Twin-Earth for a long time, we would probably return to 
using the term ‘water’ much like we did before. After all, we would need to communi-
cate with Twin-Earthlings whenever a faucet leaked, and so on.
The Twin-Earth case is very similar to the original Oracle thought experiment. In 
both cases, subjects initially retract their judgment in response to the Oracle’s testi-
mony but later return to speaking as they did before. In the Twin-Earth example, it is 
16 See Burgess and Rosen (2005: 532–4) for more detailed discussion of this example.
17 Similar remarks apply to views on which object judgments involve pretense or non-literal speech.
18 To resist the above arguments, the realist might claim that, while subjects do not actually use object 
judgments non-literally, they would decide to do so after receiving the Oracle’s testimony. In response: 
while we can certainly imagine subjects behaving this way, we can also imagine subjects who would simply 
revert to object judgments without making any such decision. For this reason, I do not think that a “fiction-
alist revolution” provides a general solution to the puzzle. I raise an additional problem with this response 
in fn. 25.
19 See Putnam (1975) for the original Twin-Earth thought experiment. In this thought experiment, 
Twin-Earth is a planet indistinguishable from Earth at the macroscopic level; for example, there is a Twin-
Earth duplicate of every person and thing on Earth. The only difference is that, whereas the clear, tasteless 
liquid	in	the	oceans,	lakes,	etc.	on	Earth	has	the	chemical	structure	H2O, on Twin-Earth this liquid has some 
other chemical structure (abbreviated ‘XYZ’).
20 This will be the response of anyone who shares Putnam’s intuition that the watery substance on Twin-
Earth is not water.
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natural to diagnose this as a case of conceptual change: our term ‘water’ first referred to 
H2O, but later referred to XYZ. It is worth considering whether this response might 
also apply to the original puzzle. If the meanings of our terms have changed, we can 
uphold the realist’s assumption that our original judgments about objects are false in 
the demon scenario.21
Against this proposal, there does not seem to be any evidence for conceptual change 
in the original thought experiment. There are three major factors thought relevant to 
reference determination: the speaker’s environment, the speaker’s referential inten-
tions, and usage. Environment explains why the term ‘water’ shifts reference after 
spending time on Twin-Earth. But in the original puzzle, we remain in the same envir-
onment. As for intentions: we can certainly imagine subjects that, after the Oracle’s 
testimony, stipulate that they will hence forth use object terms with a different mean-
ing. But we can also imagine subjects who simply return to speaking of objects as they 
did before. So a change in referential intentions does not provide a general solution to 
the puzzle.22 As for usage: we are assuming that hearing the Oracle’s testimony does not 
affect subjects’ use of object terms in ordinary contexts. So none of the characteristic 
evidence for conceptual change is present in the Oracle case.
Summary: On the proposals considered in 3.1 and 3.2, our original judgments about 
objects are literally false in the demon scenario. In this sense, the above explanations 
are each compatible with the epistemic assumptions of realism (see 2.4). But unfortu-
nately, these proposals seem to suffer independent shortcomings. Perhaps there is 
some other way for the realist to explain the continued assertibility of object judg-
ments.23 But in section 3.3, I will argue that we should take our linguistic behavior in 
the Oracle thought experiment at face value: in the demon scenario, our object judg-
ments are literally true.
3.3 Idealism
I think that what the Oracle puzzle really shows is that the realist is simply mistaken 
about the epistemology of our object discourse. The realist supposes that the truth of 
our object judgments hinges on facts about some external reality independent of 
human minds. But there is no evidence that our object judgments are actually hostage 
to fortune in this way.24
21 On this proposal, the realist would have to provide some story about what our object terms refer to 
after the Oracle’s testimony (e.g., ideas in the demon’s mind).
22 The realist might claim that, nonetheless, our implicit referential intentions change after the Oracle’s 
testimony (thanks to Kenneth Pearce for this suggestion). For ease of presentation, I will set this proposal 
aside until section 4 (see fn. 25).
23 One further proposal worth considering is functional identification: identifying ordinary objects with 
whatever items in the mind-independent “external world” cause our experiences of objects. I address a 
version of this proposal in 3.6. I discuss some additional responses in Smithson (manuscript a: section 4).
24 What about the fact that subjects retract their object judgments in the immediate aftermath of the 
Oracle’s testimony? I consider this issue below.
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The real lesson from the Oracle thought experiment is that, in any ordinary con-
text, we do not care about whatever external reality gives rise to our experiences; this 
is why we continue to make judgments about objects even after receiving the Oracle’s 
testimony. But if this is right, why would we ever think that the truth of these judg-
ments hinges on facts about the nature of some external reality? Such facts could 
only threaten our object judgments if we cared about this external world. But we 
don’t: in ordinary contexts, we make object judgments in complete indifference to 
such a world.25
What we do care about is the world as it appears to us: the world presented by our 
ordinary experiences. So, as long as our actual and counterfactual experiences coher-
ently indicate that there are tables and chairs, we will continue to judge that tables and 
chairs exist. And there is no reason to regard such judgments as anything less than true 
in their most literal sense.
A question remains: if OI is true, what explains our initial inclination to retract our 
judgments upon hearing the Oracle’s testimony?
I think this initial reaction is explained by the fact that we—or those of us initially 
sympathetic to realism—have false theoretical beliefs about our object judgments. We 
initially retract these judgments because we assume that they purport to describe some 
external reality fully independent of human minds. But we soon return to our object 
talk because this assumption is mistaken. When doing philosophy, we often treat our 
ordinary judgments as if they are theoretical hypotheses: hypotheses that aim at a cer-
tain objectivity or a certain explanatory power. So when we consider a case (such as the 
demon scenario) where our discourse apparently fails to meet these standards, we are 
tempted to conclude that our ordinary judgments are defective. But when the concerns 
of everyday life impinge upon us, we return to speaking as we did before. This is because 
the use of our language is driven by our interests and concerns, and what matters to us 
in everyday life is the world as it appears to us.26
25 Of course, we can imagine a community that responds to evidence differently than we do. We can 
suppose that, when members of this community hear the Oracle’s testimony, they give up their object dis-
course and never return to it again. But this community is not our community.
26 I’ll now consider the realist response mentioned in fn. 21: that our implicit referential intentions 
would change after the Oracle’s testimony. I’ve argued in this section that, in ordinary life, subjects go on in 
complete indifference to questions about the existence or nature of any external reality independent of 
human minds. For this reason, I think that all the linguistic dispositions that actually matter to the ordinary 
use of our object terms would remain the same after the Oracle’s testimony.
This indifference also raises a problem for revolutionary fictionalism (see fn. 17). Even speakers who 
actively decided to begin treating object discourse as fictional would soon revert to using the fictional/
non-fictional distinction as they did before. This is because a distinction on which all object discourse 
counts as fictional would be of no use to us. And we would hardly give up this useful distinction because 
of concerns about some external reality we are completely indifferent to in ordinary contexts. This sug-
gests that any decision to treat our object judgments as fictional would be semantically idle; it would have 
no bearing on our actual linguistic behavior and would not provide a real explanation of our response to 
the Oracle.
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3.4 Summary
I have argued that the best explanation of the Oracle puzzle is to reject the epistemic 
assumptions of realism. This supports premise 2:
Premise 2: If we would continue to make judgments about objects despite 
receiving evidence about some (alleged) external reality that—by the realist’s 
lights—falsifies our object judgments, then truths about objects supervene on truths 
about actual and counterfactual experiences.
Together with premise 1, this supports OI:
Ordinary Object Idealism (OI): Truths about ordinary objects and their manifest 
properties supervene on truths about actual and counterfactual human experiences.
3.5 Objection 1: An Illegitimate Focus on Language
I’ve argued that the realist’s mistaken epistemological assumptions are the result of her 
mistaken metaphysical assumption that truths about objects fail to supervene on 
truths about actual and counterfactual experiences. It is common for philosophers to 
use results from epistemology to derive metaphysical conclusions. But some theorists 
will be unhappy with this style of argument. There are different forms this objection 
might take. For example, it is sometimes emphasized that metaphysical theories are not 
about our concepts or the epistemic connections between them; instead, they are about 
what is out in the world.27
But if this claim is taken to imply that we can ignore the epistemology of our object 
judgments when theorizing about objects, it is too simplistic. This is because the epis-
temology of object judgments places constraints on what can count as an object. If a 
theory T of objects is incompatible with the epistemology of our object discourse, T is 
simply failing to talk about objects: the things like tables and chairs that interest us in 
ordinary life.
A more interesting objection is to claim that our metaphysical theories need not 
consider the actual epistemology of our object judgments; instead, they need to con-
sider how subjects should use object terms. For example, one might think that subjects’ 
failure to modify their object discourse in response to the Oracle’s testimony merely 
betrays a failure of imagination, a failure of nerve, or perhaps even a psychological 
 disability.28 One might insist that the proper response to the Oracle’s testimony would 
be for subjects to permanently give up their object discourse.
While this objection is interesting, I doubt that there is any viable way to under-
stand the normative force of the ‘should’ in this objection. The main lesson of the 
Oracle case is that we do not care about some external reality giving rise to our experi-
ences (see 3.4). But then, given these interests and concerns, it is difficult to see why 
we should use our object terms different than we actually do.
27 For related discussion, see Dowe (2000: 3).   28 Thanks to Marc Lange for this suggestion.
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3.6 Objection 2: “Non-Standard” Realists
When defending premise 2 of the Oracle thought experiment, I used the demon scenario 
as a case where—according to the realist—all actual and counterfactual experiences are 
the same, but truths about objects differ. But not all realists adopt this stance. For example, 
some realists have argued that our object judgments are actually true in a demon scen-
ario because, in such a case, our object terms would refer to (say) ideas in the demon’s 
mind.29 This conclusion can be motivated by a causal or use-based theory of reference.
Given this possible stance, there is a worry that the new epistemic argument does 
not succeed in undermining all versions of realism. To address this worry, we can 
replace the demon scenario with a new case that should be troubling even to non-
standard realists.30 We can begin by imagining a classical, atomistic Newtonian 
world—call it WN—populated by n fundamental particles. Roughly speaking, when 
these particles densely populate certain regions, an appropriately located subject has 
an experience of an object occupying that region.
WN is not itself troubling to the realist. But I will use WN as a model to construct a 
more difficult case, which I will call W*. In W*, only a small set of particles are relevant 
to generating all of our conscious experiences. One of these particles—the “mass 
particle”—has n fundamental properties whose magnitudes at a given time mirror 
the masses of the particles in WN (at the corresponding time in WN). Similarly, W* 
contains a “position particle” whose properties mirror the positions of WN’s particles. 
Going on in the same way, a small set of particles in W* “encodes” the entire physical 
state of WN. In addition, we can suppose that the psychophysical laws in W* act on 
these particles in such a way as to support the same actual and counterfactual experi-
ences as in WN. The upshot is that, in W*, all of our normal experiences of objects are 
caused by a very small set of particles.
What makes this case especially troubling for the realist is that, unlike in the demon 
scenario, there do not seem to be any concrete items in W* for our object terms to refer 
to. For this reason, even non-standard realists will say that our object judgments are 
false in this case.31 So, by replacing the demon scenario with W* in the defense of 
premise 2, the new epistemic argument undermines non-standard realisms as well.32
29 For related discussion, see Putnam (1981: ch. 1) and Chalmers (2012: E15).
30 See Smithson (manuscript a: section 3) for other examples.
31 I consider some ways a non-standard realist might resist this argument in Smithson (manuscript a, 
4.4–4.5).
32 Incidentally, W* also shows why OI excludes even “non-standard” realists—see fn. 5.
Are there any other non-idealist views that might accept OI? One possibility is Dummett’s (2004) anti-
realism. Because Dummett denies that truths about objects are recognition-transcendent, he would likely 
accept the supervenience of object truths on truths about actual and counterfactual experiences. But on the 
other hand, Dummett (1978: 19) explicitly contrasts anti-realism with idealism, claiming that anti-realism 
shows how “we can abandon realism without falling into subjective idealism.”
This is no serious concern. As discussed in section 2, there is no single best way to characterize idealism. 
So I am happy to simply grant that Dummett’s anti-realism counts as a form of idealism as I use the term 
in this essay.
Similar remarks apply to other borderline cases: any theorist willing to accept the supervenience in OI 
is idealist enough to count as such on the usage of this essay.
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4. Idealism and Ordinary Epistemology
Throughout this essay, I have remained neutral on how the idealist should develop her 
positive metaphysical view; this is because I wanted the new epistemic argument to be 
available to different types of idealists. Nonetheless, the epistemology of our object 
judgments has implications for the idealist’s positive metaphysics. In this section, I will 
discuss how the idealist should understand the dependence between objects and 
experiences if she is to secure an epistemic advantage over the realist.
4.1 The Deference Principle
The epistemic problems for realism arise because the realist assumes that object truths 
fail to supervene on truths about our experiences. By denying this assumption, the 
idealist hopes to avoid these problems. But to actually secure this epistemic advantage, 
there are constraints on how the idealist can view the relation between objects and 
experiences. In particular, the idealist must endorse the following principle:
Deference Principle: Let Si be a sentence concerning ordinary objects and their 
manifest properties. Let si be the set of (contextualized) counterfactual experiences 
ordinary subjects would (ideally) consider relevant to assessing the truth of Si. Then 
an experience e contributes to determining the truth of Si just in case e is a member 
of si. In particular, Si is true just in case ordinary subjects would (ideally) judge that 
Si is true when presented with all of the experiences in si.
Before clarifying the above terminology, it will be useful to provide an intuitive grip on 
the Deference Principle by considering some examples:
Case 1: S1 ≡ The opposite side of the book is blue.33
Which experiences do ordinary subjects consider relevant to assessing the truth of S1? 
One set are the visual experiences I would have if I were to rotate or flip the book 
around. Another set are the experiences I would have if I were to walk around to the 
other side of the book, looking at it from the opposite direction. Another set are the 
experiences other subjects would have when looking at the book from the opposite 
direction. Another set are the experiences I would have if I were looking into a mirror 
placed behind the book. All of these experiences will be members of s1. And this merely 
scratches the surface: any competent subject can imagine (and recognize) countless 
other examples.
The Deference Principle describes how all of the experiences just mentioned 
determine the truth of S1. In particular, the Deference Principle stipulates that S1 is true 
33 With the Deference Principle’s restriction to sentences concerning manifest properties, the term 
‘book’ in S1 should technically be replaced by a more neutral expression (e.g., ‘book-shaped object’). 
See fn. 4 for discussion. This being said, I will continue to use terms like ‘book’ as abbreviations in the 
discussion ahead.
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just in case ordinary subjects presented with the set of the above experiences would 
judge that S1 is true.34	Here	is	a	second	example:
Case 2: S2 ≡ The bicycle is green.
(Assumption: it is night and nothing is visible)
Since it is too dark to see, s2 will not include ordinary visual experiences of the bicycle. 
But s2 will include: the experience we would have if we were to shine a flashlight on the 
bicycle, the experience we would have if the sun were overhead, the experiences we 
would have if we scraped some paint off the bicycle and brought it to a well-lit area, 
and so on. According to the Deference Principle, S2 is true just in case ordinary sub-
jects presented with the set of these experiences would judge that S2	is	true.	Here	is	a	
final example:
Case 3: S3 ≡ The stick is straight.
(Assumption: the stick is partially submerged in water)
It is useful to think of this as a case where the experiences in si do not form a mutually 
coherent set. s3 will include many experiences that indicate that S3 is true: the tactile 
experiences of the stick, the experiences of the stick when it is taken out of water, and 
so on. But s3 will also include many experiences that indicate that S3 is false, such as the 
visual experiences of the stick when it is halfway submerged in water. So what is the 
truth value of S3, given that s3 is not a mutually coherent set?
The answer is built into the Deference Principle: S3 is true just in case ordinary sub-
jects would judge that S3 is true when presented with all of these experiences. In this 
case, subjects would certainly judge that the stick is straight. After all, we make this 
judgment on the basis of similar evidence in ordinary contexts all the time. So the 
idealist will say that S3 is true and that sticks partially submerged in water remain 
straight.35
While it is outside the scope of this essay to present any further cases, the above 
examples should help provide a working grip on the Deference Principle. There are two 
key features of this principle worth emphasizing.
34 There are a few types of experiences that, for simplicity, I will not mention in this or subsequent 
examples. These include: experiences of memories, experiences involving testimony (either from people, 
or encyclopedias, or other sources), and experiences that are only relevant to si insofar as they support 
inductive generalizations that subsume Si. There is no need to mention these experiences since their rele-
vance to Si is plausibly “screened off ” by the inclusion of other experiences in si. For example, there is no 
need to mention experiences of memories given that the experiences on which those memories are based 
are also in si.
35 With this example, I’ve gestured at how the idealist should distinguish illusions from non-illusions. 
Ordinary subjects are able to draw this distinction on the basis of the normal types of experiential evidence 
available to them. Even if they are unable to make a judgment about veridicality on the basis of their actual 
evidence, subjects recognize how further possible evidence would bear on such judgments. But if ordinary 
subjects can distinguish illusions from non-illusions, so can the idealist. This is because ordinary episte-
mology is directly built into the Deference Principle: whatever criteria ordinary subjects use to identify 
illusions, the idealist uses the same criteria.
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First: with the Deference Principle, truths about objects are determined by the 
 counterfactual experiences included in si (as well as, perhaps, facts about our epistemic 
practices). In contrast, the principle never invokes truths about an external reality 
independent of human minds. In this sense, the Deference Principle is incompatible 
with realism.36
Second: with the Deference Principle, the idealist does not offer an analysis of which 
specific types of experiences are included in si. For example, I did not try to give an 
exhaustive list of the types of experiences relevant to determining the truth of S1. 
Instead the strategy is to defer to ordinary epistemology. This feature ensures that the 
Deference Principle will not conflict with our intuitions about cases, and will therefore 
not be subject to counterexamples. Because ordinary epistemology is built right into 
the Deference Principle, an idealist endorsing this principle is guaranteed to respect 
the epistemology of our object discourse.
4.2 Clarificatory Notes
In this subsection, I’ll provide several clarificatory notes on the Deference Principle.
(i) Contextualized experiences: The experiences relevant to the principle must be 
contextualized—that is, presented to a subject with a description of what types of 
experiences they are. Each experience in si should be paired with a description that 
includes (at minimum): (a) the subject in question and (b) a description of the coun-
terfactual situation relevant to the experience. Without this information, a subject 
would be unable to interpret how the experiences in si bear on the truth of Si.37
(iii) The Cosmoscope: There are various ways to explicate the idea of a subject being 
“presented with the experiences in si”. One option is to invoke Chalmers’s (2012) 
notion of a “Cosmoscope.” The Cosmoscope is a hypothetical virtual reality device that 
allows a user to select a certain counterfactual experience and which then induces 
that experience in the user.38 For example, a user might select: the experience I would 
have if I were in position p at time t and were to look toward the book. After appropri-
ate warning, the Cosmoscope would induce this experience in the user. We can think 
of the subjects in the Deference Principle as using a Cosmoscope to learn about all of 
the counterfactual experiences in si.
(iv) Idealizations: The Deference Principle appeals to the experiences ordinary sub-
jects “ideally” consider evidentially relevant to a given assertion Si. To see why this 
idealization is needed, consider S2 ≡ “The bicycle is green”. s2 cannot be viewed as the 
36 Related to this point, the experiences invoked by the Deference Principle should be viewed as the 
types of “ordinary” experiences of objects we are accustomed to having in everyday life—see fn. 7.
37 When describing the experiences in s1–s3, I directly referred to ordinary objects (e.g., the book, the 
bicycle). This may seem puzzling, since the experiences in si are themselves supposed to determine truths 
about objects. This worry is closely related to a famous circularity objection to phenomenalism raised by 
Sellars (1963). I discuss how the idealist should respond to this objection in Smithson (manuscript b).
38 In fact, the Cosmoscope described by Chalmers is more complex. But the other features of the 
Cosmoscope will not be relevant to this essay.
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experiences considered relevant to S2 given our actual evidence; after all, our actual 
evidence may suggest that the bicycle is in the closet when, in fact, it is outside. Instead, 
s2 includes the experiences considered relevant to S2 after a certain process of idealized 
evidence-gathering. I describe how the idealist should understand this process in 
Smithson (manuscript b).39
The Deference Principle also requires an idealization for the judgment about Si that 
abstracts away from our contingent cognitive limitations. For example, the idealiza-
tion should give subjects the ability to remember an infinite number of experiences 
and allow subjects to entertain thoughts of infinite complexity.40
(v) Counterfactual conditionals: The Deference Principle should not be interpreted 
as saying that Si is true in some possible world W iff human subjects in W would (ideally) 
judge that Si is true when presented with si.41 On this reading, the Deference Principle 
would make truths about objects very subjective; it would imply, for example, that if 
humans were to make different judgments about an object’s color, then the object’s 
color would be different. The correct reading is: Si is true in some possible world W iff 
actual human subjects—using their concepts as they actually do—would (ideally) 
judge that Si is true in W when presented with si.
(vi) Neutrality: The Deference Principle constrains how the idealist views the relation 
between objects and experiences. But this constraint can be met by different underlying 
metaphysical views. For example, a phenomenalist might view the Deference Principle 
as implicitly specifying how objects are logically constructed from sense data. Other 
idealists might instead view the Deference Principle as specifying how facts about 
experiences metaphysically ground facts about objects. On my own preferred 
semantic version of idealism (“edenic idealism”—see Smithson (manuscript a)), the 
Deference Principle specifies how counterfactual experiences select a certain possible 
world as the one our object discourse is about.
4.3 A Correspondence between Truth and Judgment
With the Deference Principle, the idealist assumes that truths about ordinary objects 
correspond to subjects’ (fully informed, idealized) judgments about objects. In this 
sense, the idealist assumes that judgments about objects are similar to judgments 
about games.
Suppose we are told all of the relevant details about the rules, aims, history, etc. of a 
practice X. Suppose that, on the basis of all of this information, we judge that X is a 
game. It is implausible that, nonetheless, X could fail to be a game. For example, when 
told all of the details about the rules, aims, history, etc. of chess, we judge that chess is a 
39 I note that the experiences in si may not be those we explicitly believe to be relevant to Si. It is possible 
for subjects to have mistaken beliefs about the epistemology of our assertions.
40 For an example of an idealization that would work in the current context, see Chalmers (2012: 63–71).
41	 Here,	si is the relevant set of counterfactual experiences supported in W.
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game. It is not coherent to suppose that, nonetheless, chess might not really be a game 
after all. So we can motivate the following principle:
Deference Principle for Games: Let Gi be a sentence of the form “X is a game.” 
Gi is true just in case ordinary subjects would (ideally) judge that Gi is true when 
given a full description of the rules, aims, history, etc. of the practice X in question.
Similarly, the idealist’s Deference Principle asserts that, if subjects were presented with 
all of the experiences ordinarily considered relevant to assessing Si, and thereby judged 
that Si is true, it could not be the case that, nonetheless, Si is false.
That there is such a correspondence between truth and judgment is the main lesson 
of the Oracle thought experiment (see 2.4). This thought experiment shows that, 
when making judgments about ordinary objects, we do not care about whatever 
mind-independent external reality gives rise to our experiences; instead, we care 
about the world as it appears to us. For this reason, we should not expect truths about 
ordinary objects to outstrip judgments about objects made on the basis of all of the 
counterfactual experiences in si.42
5. Conclusion
In this essay, I have presented a new epistemic argument for idealism. I have argued 
that, even if we were to receive evidence that—by the realist’s lights—falsifies our judg-
ments about ordinary objects, we would continue to make judgments about objects 
just as we did before. I then argued that the best response to this puzzle is to conclude 
that truths about objects do not outstrip truths about our experiences in the ways that 
realists typically suppose.
In the second half of the essay, I discussed how ordinary epistemology constrains 
the idealist’s own positive metaphysics. If the idealist is to respect ordinary epistemol-
ogy, she must endorse the Deference Principle as specifying how truths about our 
experiences determine truths about objects.43
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